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PRESENTED BY

A. G. Cameron, Ph.D.
A REJOINDER

to

THE PRINCETON REVIEW,

UPON

THE ELOHIM REVEALED,

touching

THE DOCTRINE OF IMPUTATION

and

KINDRED TOPICS.

by

SAMUEL J. BAIRD.

PHILADELPHIA:
Joseph M. Wilson, No. 111 South Tenth Street, below Chestnut.
1860.
A REJOINDER.

In the summer of 1854, a minister appeared at the bar of one of our Presbyteries as an applicant for membership, having a certificate of dismission in good standing from a sister Presbytery. In the course of the consequent examination, the question was asked, "What relation do we sustain to the sin of Adam?" Answer—"We sinned in him and fell with him." "Do you mean anything more than that we are regarded and treated as though we had sinned in Adam?" "I mean that we sinned in him, and are therefore so treated." "But how did we sin in him?" "We were in him seminally, as our root and cause; and, as members, were intrinsically involved in a true and proper responsibility for the action of our head." "How is this parallel with gratuitous justification?" "In the first place, the parallel fails, by the whole extent of the difference between law and grace; since our relation to Adam comes confessedly within the province of the legal covenant, and that to the second Adam belongs to the covenant of grace. In the second place, the parallel is sustained, in the mode in which Christ's righteousness is bestowed upon us; which is by our engrafting into him in regeneration." "But Dr. Hodge teaches that we did not really sin in Adam, but are only so regarded and treated." "I am aware that such is his opinion; but I do not so understand the Bible, nor our constitution." This avowal was the signal for a storm of denunciation against the examinee, in which he was stigmatized by leading members with almost every name of heresy which is most obnoxious to the Reformed Churches.

Pending the discussion, the following paper was laid upon the table by the party under examination:

"I hold (1.) That the covenant was made with Adam, not only for himself but for his posterity. (2.) That the cause of Adam's federal relation was the mere good pleasure of God. (3.) That the relation thus ordained finds occasion and justification in the fact that we were present
in Adam. (4.) That this presence in him is not physical, on the one hand, nor merely putative on the other, but real; and although beyond our full comprehension, as are, in fact, all the ultimate phenomena of our being, yet this much seems clearly ascertained by reason, and confirmed by scripture; to wit,—that we are not mere offshoots from Adam, formed in the same mould; but by ordinary generation derive something real, the germ of our being, upon which are predicated those attributes which commonly pass under the name of nature. Levi was in the loins of Abraham when Melchizedek met him. (5.) That hence the imputation of Adam's sin is not merely legal, but the legal charge is based on the prior fact, that we being really in him in his sin, were so justly condemned in his condemnation.

"On the other hand I hold, (1.) That it was necessary for the Son of God to assume human nature by generation, so as to be one with our race, and so subject to the law of God for our sins; whilst being begotten by the power of the Holy Ghost, and not by ordinary generation, he was free from the sinfulness of our nature. (2.) That the believer is, by the communication to him of the Holy Spirit, dwelling in and proceeding from Christ, united to him in a real union, expressed by the scriptures as being 'members of his body, of his flesh and of his bones,' &c. (3.) That this identity it is which entitles the believer to claim Christ's righteousness as his, by virtue of which he is justified at the bar of God. (4.) That hence it follows, that whilst the plan of salvation thus wrought is altogether gratuitous, and hence of mere grace,—on the other hand, as by the wonderful working of that free grace we are engrafted into Christ, and he is made our Head, the law being satisfied, we may with reverent boldness and adoring gratitude make the plea at the bar of justice of 'Not guilty,' since Christ and all he has done is not only putatively, but, by free grace uniting us, really ours.

"P. S.—This paper having been written in great haste, during recess of Presbytery, any verbal inaccuracy or inadvertent omission is thereby accounted for.

SAMUEL J. BAIRD."

Upon the reading of this paper it was remarked—"That is just what you said before." The reply was—"It is what I meant to say, and upon which I am ready to stand or fall." The ultimate result was the adoption by the Presbytery of a resolution formally expressive of confidence in my orthodoxy, and disavowing all responsibility for the impeachments which had been urged by members with so much violence.

Such was the occasion whence grew the publication of The Elohim Revealed. Three considerations impelled the author to write: His
personal orthodoxy had been bitterly impeached, and he did not choose to leave his character at the mercy of whispered rumors which might steal abroad: doctrines which he felt to involve the very marrow of gospel divinity, were assailed and denounced, and he felt called upon to bear a testimony in their behalf: and the mode of attack showed a spirit of haughty intolerance to which he could give place by subjection,—no, not for an hour. That my assailants were not unworthy representatives of the school of opinions to which they belonged, the review of The Elohim Revealed in the April number of the Princeton Repertory is evidence; and considerations very near akin to those which induced my former publication, impel me again to trespass upon the patience of my brethren. The authority of Dr. Hodge was the standard of appeal by my assailants in Presbytery. The opinions which they embraced it has been the cherished labor of his life to fortify and disseminate. Those opinions, as set forth in his published writings, were, in The Elohim Revealed, examined in a spirit of fraternal courtesy and unfeigned deference; but with the liberty which, on such a subject, is proper to one who claims to be the Lord's freeman. Under such circumstances, it was to be expected that the judgment passed upon the book by the professor, if he saw fit to notice it at all, would be condemnatory. And had such a decision been pronounced, as the result of a calm, deliberate and candid examination, backed by all the powerful and extended influence which the reviewer enjoys, the effect, however detrimental, I was prepared to have met in silence, awaiting the ultimate judgment of the church, when the whole argument should have been maturely weighed, and prejudices lost in the lapse of time.

But my reviewer has chosen a different course. In an article,—the tone of which is condemned even by the author's returning sense of propriety, before his ink was dry, or the last sentence had been written,—an article confessedly immature and hasty,—confessedly marked by irritation of feeling,* and which, as a neces-

* "It is one of the infelicities of a review that it is commonly written currente calamo, and sent piecemeal to the press before the ink is thoroughly dried. It is, therefore, apt to bear the impress of the feelings which the book reviewed makes at the time on the writer's mind. If it could be laid aside, and allowed to cool, much might be softened or modified. It is possible that, when we come to see this review in print, we may wish that some things had been otherwise expressed," &c.—Princeton Review, April, 1860, p. 375.
sary consequence, is unjust to the work, both in respect to its style and doctrines—the attempt is made by the mere force of scornful denunciation, to trample opposition in the dust, and annihilate at once author and book.* In these circumstances, I address my brethren with confidence of an impartial hearing. "If I be an offender, or have committed anything worthy of death, I refuse not to die; but if there be none of these things whereby these accuse me, no man may deliver me unto them." Did the matters involved merely concern personal interests and character, I should hesitate to claim the attention of the church. But the whole question relates to doctrines which are fundamental to the gospel scheme,—doctrines, upon some of which, relating to the vital subject of justification, I did not imagine, until the appearance of the review in question, there could be any difference among intelligent Presbyterians. Whoever, therefore, may be in error in the present discussion, the importance of the issues cannot be questioned, and the claim upon the attention of those who are set for the defence of the gospel is invested with proportionate authority. It is proper to add that if, upon the points here considered, it is my misfortune to lie under the censure of the reviewer, I enjoy, on the other hand, the approving suffrages of some of the brightest ornaments of the church of the present day. Theological professors and distinguished divines of the United Presbyterian, the Reformed Presbyterian, and the Reformed Dutch and other churches, as well as of our own, have, in public and private, given their hearty sanction, and bid me God speed in these labors.

The metaphysical aspects of the subjects involved are much insisted upon by the reviewer. A series of philosophical absurdities are attributed to the work, and represented as essential to its theological conclusions. The real questions, however, are purely theological, and admit of no solution, but by the appeal of faith to the Word of God. The first of these is as to the moral relation which we sustain to Adam's sin:—Are we therein criminals, or only victims? And like to it is the other:—How does Christ's righteousness become ours in order to justification? These are the questions with which I am concerned, and in the presence of which mere

* With truly admirable ingenuity the review is so written as to avoid giving its thousands of readers, on either side of the Atlantic, a hint that the peculiar teachings of the reviewer are called in question in the book! To them, his attitude is that of lofty impartiality.
metaphysical speculations are of secondary importance. In fact, the only use to which any discussions of philosophy are appropriated in the book is, to obviate objections arising from the oppositions of false science—to show that the deductions of a true philosophy harmonize with the teachings of God's word. Were every principle of the philosophy utterly overthrown, still would I cleave to the doctrines, to the illustration of which they are adduced; because those doctrines do not stand in the wisdom of men, but in the testimony of God.

It is, however, necessary to notice the light in which some of these speculative principles are exhibited in the Review, as the assault upon them is designed and calculated to disparage the doctrines with which they are associated. First among them is the doctrine as to that which is designated the nature of man. Of this, our definition will be seen in the following citations:

"The word, nature, is that by which we designate the permanent forces, which were, at the beginning, incorporated in the constitution of Adam and the creatures, and which, by their severality, determine and define the several species of living things. . . . The substances were at the beginning endowed with forces, which are distinctive and abiding, and which in organic nature flow distributively in continuous order, to the successive generations of the creatures. Of these forces, the word nature is the expression. In its proper use, it conveys the distinct idea of permanent indwelling force. It expresses the sum of the essential qualities or efficient principles of a given thing, viewed in their relation to its substance, as that in which they reside, and from whence they operate. . . . The word is not, therefore, expressive of a mere abstraction, but designates an actual thing, an objective reality. Thus, the human nature consists in the whole sum of the forces which, original in Adam, are perpetuated and flow in generation to his seed."

That this definition should be the subject of such bitter attack as it has incurred is very surprising. That it is not new, it would be superfluous to prove to any who have access to the standard lexicographers. That, in its relation to theology, it is not peculiar to me, will appear in the following quotation from a divine of the highest

*The Elohim Revealed, pp. 148, 149, 150.
authority. "By nature," says Breckinridge, "we mean the sum of all the forces, spiritual, moral, intellectual and physical, which make up our being, and give it its peculiar character."* This definition is consistently followed throughout my work. Thus, in discussing the principle of the law of God, it is remarked,—"The word nature we have formerly defined to be the designation of a permanent force, dwelling in a substance. A moral nature is one, the essential characteristics of which are reason, will, and the moral sense or conscience. . . . The proper subject of a moral nature is a spiritual substance. In no other mode have we any reason to imagine it possible for it to exist."† And again, in another place:—"The nature comprehends all the forces which are proper to the person in which it subsists. Among these are not only included those of which obligation or obedience may be supposed, but those susceptibilities upon which may be predicated the realization of suffering, the endurance of punishment. . . . Were it possible to take away the nature, and yet the person remain;—were it possible to suppose any other forces proper to the person than all its proper forces," &c.‡ The definition thus so unambiguously given and often reiterated, is by our reviewer entirely disregarded, and the whole argument of the review goes upon the assumption that I represent the nature of man as being a substance derived from Adam and inhering in his seed. On this point two or three remarks are submitted.

1. As between Augustinian realism and the nominalism of Rosceline and Abelard, the sympathies of the author are unequivocally indicated in favor of the former. The fact is stated that the latter was in its origin identified with the growth of Pelagianism in the mediæval church. And if by the charge of realism be meant no more than acceptance of the doctrine of the illustrious father, we should readily plead guilty. But not only is the assertion that the realism of the Greek philosophy involved the substantial existence of universals a very questionable assumption, but the pretence that this idea is essential to or recognized in the doctrine of Augustine on original sin, is altogether unwarranted, as any one may see by reference to his statements quoted in our treatise.§ The realism of Augustine is that of causal forces, and not of universal substances.

*Knowledge of God, Objectively Considered, p. 498.
†The Elohim Revealed, pp. 236, 237. ‡Ib. p. 250. §Ib. pp. 19, 496.
Further, the attempt to disparage by such an impeachment the theology of Augustine, is significant. The Reformed church has been accustomed to boast its Augustinian theology, especially on original sin.

2. It is certain that a nature cannot exist nor act except in a substance; and so we have repeatedly stated in our treatise. It by no means follows, however, that it may not be transmitted without the transmission of substance. Momentum can only be predicated of matter; and yet the familiar illustration of the series of suspended balls proves its propagation from one to another, without any transmission of substance. So the transmission of forces through successive generations of living beings does not imply, as necessary thereto, any conveyance of substance. The apostacy of man's nature could not take place but by a personal act. The propagation of the nature conveys to other persons the responsibility of the act, although not committed personally by them.

3. In The Elohim Revealed, the nature of Adam is spoken of as "an objective reality," and not a mere abstract or subjective conception. This phrase, which merely expresses the fact of the real existence of the forces which the word, nature, designates, seems to be interpreted by the reviewer as equivalent to an assertion that the nature is a substance. The momentum which conveys the planets through their orbits is not a mere idea in the mind, but an objective reality in nature. Must it, therefore, of necessity be a substance?

4. That there should be some incautious expressions in a treatise so extensive, is not surprising. Some of these, as the result has shown, are susceptible of being tortured into a meaning which the author never designed, and against which the context will be recognized by impartial criticism as sufficient caution.

5. Although the manuscript was submitted to the examination of eminent theologians before its publication, and the work has since been reviewed and criticised by scholars of every class, no suspicion of realism (so-called) was suggested in any quarter, until it was announced to the classes in the seminary at Princeton, by one of the professors, as the discovery, elsewhere, of a distinguished divine. Subsequently, the reviews at Princeton and Columbia made their appearance; in which, simultaneously, the charge was made; accompanied, in the former, by an abundant citation of passages from the book, but without any indication of the mode in which
the obnoxious doctrine was deduced therefrom; in the latter, from the pen of the original author of the impeachment, with an explicit statement of the ground upon which it was based. From a charge thus originated in hostile criticism alone, we might claim immediate acquittal. The proof, however, which is attempted in the Southern Review, gives us the means of exposing its fallacy, and enables us to appeal to the professor at Columbia, in refutation of the impeachment, as endorsed at Princeton.

After full citations from our treatise, Dr. Thornwell deduces the following as its doctrine:—"The substance of the soul, as endowed with the forces which realize themselves in the faculties and energies of the personal consciousness—of which these operations are the signs and characteristics—that substance as a causal force, which underlies them all, and conditions and determines them all, that substance is the nature. Or, if there be any distinction between them, the substance is the ground, and the nature, the causal energies contained in it. That is, the soul, considered as simple being, may be called substance; considered as a cause, or endowed with power, it is nature; the word, nature, expressing directly the forces; and, substance, that in which they inhere. But for all the purposes of speculation, the difference is purely formal. A substance to human thought is only the correlative of the properties which manifest it."* Such is the conclusion to which this writer comes, as the result of a careful analysis of the various statements of The Elohim Revealed, on the subject. In the passages which we have italicised, he represents clearly and correctly the doctrine of the book. In the closing sentence, he states a postulate of his own, in which a signal fallacy has eluded his acuteness. For some of "the purposes of speculation, the difference between substance and nature is purely formal." But it is by no means true in all cases. It is not true when the question is asked whether the nature is a substance. It is not true when the inquiry is as to the propagation of nature. Here we accept an argument of Dr. Hodge, in which, aiming at us, he only exposes the error of our southern reviewer: "There may be an immaterial principle which determines the species of every plant and animal, and secures its permanency; but what necessity is there for assuming that principle to be a substance numerically the same with the first of each kind?  

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*Southern Presbyterian Review, April, 1860, p. 172.
If the chemical properties belonging to an acorn, or the germ of a nascent animal, may be the same in kind, from generation to generation, without assuming the transmission of a chemical substance, why may not the principle of life remain permanent, without any such transmission of substance?"* Truly, we cannot see why. And since it is so, our reviewer himself being judge, we ask, Why should the distinction between the nature and substance be obliterated, as it is in the argument of Dr. Thornwell; if not for the purpose of holding the obnoxious book responsible for absurdities of which it is entirely innocent? It appears, then, Dr. Thornwell being witness, that according to The Elohim Revealed, nature is not a substance, but a force dwelling in a substance. And we have seen, upon the authority of Dr Hodge, that the proposition is erroneous, by which the southern reviewer confounds the distinction between the nature or force, and the substance in which it inheres. And yet this constitutes the only plausible pretext for charging the book with the realism which is attributed to it by these writers.

Hence the assertion, that upon this theory Adam and his race are one substance. "According to this view humanity is one substance, in which inhere certain forces. This substance was originally in Adam, and has been by propagation communicated to all his descendants, so that the substance with its forces, which constitutes them what they are, is numerically the same as that which was in him and made him what he was."† "The assumption of a generic human nature, as an objective reality, constituting all men numerically one in substance with Adam, is a pure figment, unentitled to any weight or authority in determining Christian doctrine."‡ So it is; and in the same category is to be included the pretence that this absurdity is taught in the book. Besides passages which we have already quoted, the only proof adduced by the reviewer, is the following sentences:—"The human nature consists in the whole sum of the forces which, original in Adam, are perpetuated and flow in generation to his seed. And our oneness of nature does not express the fact, merely, that we and Adam are alike; but that we are thus alike, because the forces which are in us and make us what we are, were in him, and are numeri-

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ally the same which in him constituted his nature and gave him his likeness.\*\* This language is open to just exception, in so far as it may seem to represent the forces which constitute the nature of an individual of the posterity of Adam to be formally the same as those of Adam's nature, and exhaustive of them. The intention of the writer was merely to assert that although changed in form, the forces of Adam's seed are transmitted from him—that forces which were in him were the cause of those of his seed. Here we reiterate the admission and challenge already quoted from our reviewer:—"There may be an immaterial principle which determines the species of every plant and animal, and secures its permanency; but what necessity for assuming that principle to be a substance, numerically the same with the first of each kind?"† The reviewer does not then venture to deny the existence of such an "immaterial principle," the very thing which is asserted in the passages which he quotes. But he demands:—"Wherein does this assumed numerical identity exist? Is it in the principle of life? But can any one tell what that is? Is it a substance? Has human skill ever yet discovered what life is, whether in plant or animal? And must a whole system of theology be founded on a conjecture as to its nature?"‡ No, it ought not. But in return, we venture one question, which may complete the series. Does our reviewer found his theology in the denial of the existence of such a principle? What it is, may be hard to say. Does he therefore require us to forget that it is?

We do not propose here to defend our sentiments on identity and the generic unity of the human race. Those who may be curious on the subject, will find the discussion in the work in question. Our present aim is to rectify the misapprehensions to which the statements of the Review may give rise, as to what they are. To this purpose a brief extract will serve:—

"We have had occasion to observe a law of representation which runs through the Scriptures, and is developed especially in the cases of the headship of Adam to the race, and the believer justified in Christ. That principle we have stated to be, that community in a propagated nature constitutes such a oneness as immediately identifies the possessor in the relations of that nature in the progenitor whence it springs. This principle seems to be but one particular, under the general proposition that continuity of organic force constitutes identity, in any substance

whether material or spiritual. In this expression, we consider an organism as a substance, simple or compound, clothed with its distinctive forces, constituting it an efficient cause; and by the phrase, continuity of organic force, we design to intimate that in whatever direction those forces flow, and to whatever extent, they operate to bind the substances upon which they act, in a relation of identity. By identity is of course not meant absolute numerical oneness, in all respects; but that of which, to given purposes, the same proposition may be predicated immediately and per se. Thus, we have no assurance that the body of the aged man contains among all its material elements, a particle which was in it in his infancy. The identity is predicated upon the continuous operation of those vital forces which have pervaded and built it up, repaired its breaches and determined its character. So, too, of the tree or the rock, the star or the system. Again, all identities are not of the same order; as there is, for example, a distinct identity belonging to each limb of the body, and another of a higher grade common to them all in the unity of the body. These grades of identity are determined by the degree to which the subordinate substance is pervaded and controlled by the organic forces whence the identity is predicated. Thus, forces which are common to the solar system give it an identity of one grade, comprehending in it not only the planets in their mass, but every organism and every atom belonging to any of them; all of which are embraced in the common forces of gravitation, repulsion, and so on. On the other hand, each particular planet has its more intimate identity, constituted by the addition to the forces which it possesses in common with the others, of those which operate more immediately upon its own materials. So may we trace a growing intimacy of identity, until we come to the indivisible molecules.

"So it is in the moral and spiritual world. By one Spirit are believers all baptised into one body. By this baptism, no one loses the identity of his own person: but 'by the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus,' he is introduced into a higher identity—identity in Him 'from whom the whole body fitly joined together, and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love.'—Eph. iv. 16. It is thus, by the pervasive power of the Spirit of Christ, moulding and controlling the whole that the identity is wrought, of which Christ so remarkably says, 'That they all may be one, as thou, Father, art in me, and I in thee, that they may be one in us. ... That they may be one, even as we are one; I in them, and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one.'—John xvii. 21-23.

"Parallel to this is the identity which we sustain to the first Adam. By birth we acquire a distinct and separate personality, having an identity.
of its own, of the same grade and degree as was that of Adam's person. But with this distinct personality there is associated a community in Adam's moral nature, by virtue of the continuity of forces flowing from him to us, embracing us in an identity with his nature, and involving our communion in his apostacy from God. Hence, the Scripture forms of expression, of our being in him, sinning in him, and dying in him.**

On a subject so abstruse, it were futile to attempt such accuracy of language as to prevent the possibility of misapprehension, or be impregnable to hostile criticism. The statement—that the causative principle which operates in generation constitutes a bond of identity between the progenitor and those of whom he is the cause, such as to involve them immediately in the relations and responsibilities of his nature, to an extent proportionate to that in which they are pervaded and controlled by that nature,—embodies with sufficient distinctness and fullness the doctrine of representative union or identity, as stated with perhaps less critical accuracy in the beginning of the above extract, but distinctly developed in the subsequent parts of it, and illustrated throughout the volume.

As relating to the body of which Christ is the head, we venture to assert that this doctrine is not theory, but a most precious testimony of the gospel. In the parallel case of the first Adam and his seed, nothing but experience of the fact could persuade us that the Scripture warrant for it is questionable. In its other relations it would seem to be one of the plainest of the postulata of common sense. And, in fact, it is not until a preposterous caricature has been thrust into its place, that our reviewer ventures to assail it. By taking advantage of the generality of the statement of the law of representation with which the extract begins, and disregarding the careful exposition of it which follows, and the abundant illustrations which the work exhibits, he finds it easy to demonstrate against us the charge of excessive stupidity and folly, resulting in a climax of revolting heresy.

In the first place, as we have seen, by nature the reviewer represents us as meaning a common substance, and not, as defined in the book, an indwelling force. Again, whereas we state explicitly, that "by identity is of course, not meant, absolute numerical oneness, in all respects; but that of which to given purposes the same proposition may be predicated immediately and per se,"—it only

* The Elohim Revealed, p. 494.
requires the omission of a mere monosyllable, to make us teach that
absolute numerical oneness is the very thing we do mean; and such
is the light in which the reviewer presents us. Further, the causa-
tive principle which is characteristic of propagation, which is com-
mensurate with identity and determinate of it, and so represented
in the place above quoted as fundamental and essential to the whole
doctrine, is entirely ignored; and the book held responsible for all
the consequences resulting from the omission.

Of the manner in which the case thus made out inures to the pur-
poses of the review, the doctrine respecting the person of Christ, pre-
sents a signal illustration. "If he was truly the son of David, accord-
ing to his human nature; if he was, in the strict and proper sense of
the words, the seed of Abraham; and if community of nature involves
community in the guilt and pollution belonging to that nature, how
are we to avoid the inevitable, although shocking conclusion, that
Christ was guilty and polluted? . . . If a man commits a crime
he is guilty, and even omnipotence cannot undo the deed. If it is true
that we apostatized in Adam, omnipotence cannot make it untrue.
And if it is true that all who partake of Adam's nature shared in
his apostasy, and are morally chargeable with its guilt, then it must
be true of Christ. That his human nature sinned in Adam is a
simple fact of the past, according to the theory of this book; and all
the power in the universe cannot make it no fact," &c.*

The points thus urged, so far from refuting the doctrine of the
book, serve to establish it. If the human nature were a substantial
entity which sinned in Adam, and that substance constituted the
human nature of Christ, then unquestionably would his humanity
have been guilty and corrupt. But, if, instead of this, the doctrine
of the book be truly taken and candidly traced, it solves every
difficulty suggested. As already shown, that doctrine is, that a
nature is a causative force inhering in a substance,—"that in what-
ever direction those forces flow, and to whatever extent, they
operate to bind the substances upon which they act in a relation of
identity,"—and that there are various grades of this identity, "de-
termined by the degree to which the subordinate substance is per-
vaded and controlled by the organic forces whence the identity is
predicated." In the Lord Jesus there were two natures, human
and divine. In a lower degree, he was identified with the human

race, in so far as the nature of Adam was the subordinate cause of his humanity, his body and soul. But that nature was not the cause of his moral attitude. On the contrary, the Holy Spirit was the efficient principle of generative activity in the nature of the virgin, producing his humanity; and his whole being was "pervaded and controlled" by the divine nature of the Son of God; so that upon the principles of the book, his entire person was natively identified in the moral attitude of that nature, both as relating to the sanctions and precepts of the law.

We shall present but one additional illustration of the sort of justice which the representations of the review are calculated to do us, before passing to the more important questions of theology, which are at issue. On page 359 of the Review, we are told that in The Elohim Revealed, "the immediate creation of the soul, as opposed to the theory of propagation, is declared to be 'the fundamental doctrine of the Pelagian system.' On page 364, he [the author] complains of orthodox theologians as uniting 'with Pelagians in explaining away the teachings of the Scriptures on the origin of the soul, in obedience to the dicta of an intrusive philosophy.' The doctrine that the soul is an immediate creation, he says, 'introduces a gross and revolting dualism into man's nature. As originally made, Adam comprehended in one being the two distinct elements of soul and body. In the unity of these elements there subsisted a common identity, a common consciousness, common moral relations, and a common moral character.' On the same page it is said, 'there is no distinct mention of the creation of the soul at all; but the whole style of the narrative (in Genesis) seems to imply that it was created within the body, in an original, perfect, and inseparable identification with it.'—p. 365. This is as near materialism as any orthodox writer could well go. Here is a denial of 'dualism' in man's nature; and the assertion of 'a perfect and inseparable identification of soul and body.' Then, the soul and body are one and the same thing, or at least inseparable, incapable of separate existence. This is the doctrine, on the one hand, of such materialists as Priestley, and on the other of the mystical school of modern Germany, as shown in our last number."

Our statement that the creation theory was fundamental to the system of Pelagius, is a very innocent allusion to a historical fact, the proof of which is given in the book. Wiggers, the historian

* Review, p. 359.
of the Pelagian controversy, thus states the first of the principles of Pelagius' system: "1. A propagation of sin by generation is by no means to be admitted. This physical propagation of sin can be admitted only when we grant the propagation of the soul by generation. But this is a heretical error; consequently, there is no original sin."* But this is comparatively a trivial matter. We ask the reader to weigh with candor the following extract from the book, a few disjointed sentences of which constitute the ground of charging the author with materialism.

"There are objections which appear insurmountable against the doctrine that the soul is an immediate creation. First, it introduces a gross and revolting dualism into man's nature. As originally made, Adam comprehended in one being the two distinct elements of body and soul, joined together in a union, which was essential to their normal condition and to the happiness of man—a union which nothing but the penal curse could have dissolved. In the unity of these elements there subsisted a common identity, a common consciousness, common moral relations, and a common moral character. And it is a fact not without significance, that in the narrative of his creation there is no intimation of an extraneous creation of the soul, and its subsequent insertion in the body. 'The Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man was a living soul.' We behold the dust moulded into form and symmetry, but breathless and lifeless. We look again, and the inanimate clay is warm with vital heat; the breath of life fills the lungs; the light of intelligence beams from the eye, and an immortal spirit dwells within. Thus, although diverse elements enter into his being, there is nothing to suggest or counteract any conception at variance with the most perfect and inseparable unity. We read nothing to sustain the assertion of Turretin, that Adam's soul came extrinsically through creation, and was infused into his body by the breath of God. It was not his soul, but his breath which was breathed into his nostrils; and of any extrinsic creation of the soul, and its subsequent infusion into the body, we have no intimation. In fact there is no distinct mention of the creation of the soul at all; but the whole style of the narrative seems to imply that it was created within the body, in an original, perfect and inseparable identification with it. But, on the contrary, by the doctrine which we here oppose, we are introduced to man as comprehending in his person two distinct and separate individuals, two several beings. They are described as independent in the sources and even in the time of their origin; as possessing severally

*The Elohim Revealed: p. 17; which see for the evidence from the pen of Pelagius himself.
complete constitutions, prior to and irrespective of their connection with each other; as having originally distinct and contrasted moral characters; as bound to each other by a relation, not essential and ab origine, but accidental and secondary, by virtue of a factitious and mechanical union; and when thus brought together, acting as distinct individuals upon each other as extraneous and antagonistic influences; so that in the process, the soul, hitherto uncorrupted, is defiled and enslaved in sin, in consequence of its connection with the body, which derives and conveys to it corruption of nature from our apostate parents.

"It results from these views that Adam’s soul and body were not inseparably united; that is to say, he was not created immortal; and that the separation which takes place at death, so far from being a penal condition—an unhappy effect of the curse against sin, should rather be regarded as a desirable estate—the restoration of the soul to its native and normal condition; and that the soul, so far from anticipating the resurrection with desire and joy, should rather recoil from it, as from the resumption of broken and cast-off fetters," &c.*

Such and more to the same effect is the language from which the reviewer culs an expression or two, which he declares are “as near materialism as any orthodox writer could well go. Here is a denial of ‘dualism’ in man’s nature; and the assertion of ‘a perfect and inseparable identification’ of soul and body. Then, the soul and body are one and the same thing; or, at least inseparable, incapable of separate existence.” We pray the reader to observe what kind of dualism it is that we deny to man, and with it compare the sense in which the reviewer would have us understood. Observe the manner in which our statement in reference to the original inseparableness of body and soul, the native immortality of man, is misapplied to his present condition, as under the curse; in order to induce the impression that we represent body and soul as now inseparable, “incapable of separate existence;” although our express language to the contrary lay open before the writer’s eyes. And let our readers decide upon what principle to account for the manner in which the reviewer seems to interpret the phrase, “inseparable identification,” as though it meant the contradictory of distinct subsistence.† The last sentence of this extraordinary criti-

* The Elohim Revealed, p. 365.
† Webster defines “Identify: 1. To ascertain or prove to be the same. 2. To make, to be the same; to unite or combine in such a manner as to make one interest, purpose, or intention.” He quotes Dr. J. M. Mason as saying that “Paul has identified the two ordinances, circumcision and baptism;” and the British ministry in 1805, declaring that a certain treaty “identified Spain with the republican government of France.”
icism constitutes an appropriate and harmonious crown to the whole: "Dr. Baird, however, is so characteristically incorrect and undiscriminating in his language, that it is by no means certain that he intended, even when he wrote what has just been quoted, to assert that the body and soul are identical, or even that they are inseparable." We leave it to superior discernment to judge how the writer of this sentence designed it to be interpreted by his thousands of readers. Are they to understand that he was actually at a loss as to the meaning of the book in the place from whence he quotes, or even of the expressions which he cites? And if this be so, of what value are the criticisms of such a pen? In any case, what is to be thought of the writer, who upon such grounds as these, does not hesitate to stab the character of a minister of Christ, by the charge of symbolizing with the materialism of Priestley and the mysticism of Germany?

As to our doctrine on the origin of the soul, we venture to offer the following, from The United Presbyterian Review, as a contrast to the severity of this writer. It is from the pen of the Rev. Dr. J. T. Cooper, of the United (late Associate) Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia. The name is a sufficient pledge of the weight and value of the judgment:

"We have never seen, and we question if there is anywhere to be found a more able and thorough discussion of this abstruse point, than the one with which we are presented in this chapter. His reasoning on this subject occupies no less than fifty pages of the book, and after giving it two careful readings, we cannot refrain from expressing the feelings of admiration with which the exhibition of the author's skill and logical powers in the treatment of this subject has inspired us. All our preconceived views and feelings were in direct antagonism with the position here taken with relation to the origin of the soul; but we have been forced to yield. We are still conscious of a feeling of repugnance to the conclusion here arrived at; but the author has so fortified his position at every point, by the inductive mode in which he has treated the subject, that we see not how it is in the power of reason to overthrow it. We have sought for some unguarded point on which to make out attack, but in vain."*

It is worthy of remark, that in the able and extended review, from which the above extract is taken, there is no trace of suspicion that the book is chargeable with the realism, materialism and other atrocious heresies which are attributed to it by the Repertory.

*United Presbyterian Review, April, 1860, p. 245.
But we must turn to the theological questions, which are the real issues between us and our reviewer.

On imputation, the reviewer says:—"The general principle is laid down that nothing can be imputed to a man which is not really his own; his own—that is, not on the ground of a legal relation, but his own morally, as constituting his personal character."* In support of this representation, he quotes two or three sentences from a discussion respecting the doctrine of the covenant of works, concerning which we shall have occasion to show that he confounds the principles of that covenant with those of the covenant of grace. Neither, however, in those places, nor elsewhere, is the principle to be found which is here charged upon us. In the very definition of imputation, the reverse is expressly asserted; and in the whole doctrine of the book the principle of the definition is consistently sustained. After a discussion of the nature of imputation, we thus sum up the result:—"Imputation, then, is the finding of the facts upon a judicial investigation—the entering of the verdict, by which the case is defined in its true character; a comparison of which with the requirements of the law constitutes the ground of the decision of the judge, either of approval or condemnation. In this imputation the case is never viewed or represented in any other light than precisely as it is. For example: it does not consider him as a personal sinner—an immediate transgressor—who is only guilty in the person of another, his representative; nor does it account him to be righteous, who, though chargeable with no personal dereliction, has transgressed in the person of another. In short, in imputation, a faithful record is made of the case, precisely as it is, in all its aspects and elements."†

In respect to the imputation of Adam's sin, the reviewer says of us:—"He devotes a whole section to prove that his view is not identical with that of Placæus. This was the more necessary as he adopts all the principles on which that doctrine is founded, and urges all the arguments against immediate imputation which were ever advanced by Placæus, or by Pelagians, Socinians or Remonstrants. His doctrine is neither the one nor the other," &c. And yet, before the page is finished, we are told that—"Wherein he differs, or supposes he differs from this doctrine, [that of Placæus,] he deceives himself with words. He does not see that what he says means nothing. He makes distinctions where there is no difference, and supposes himself to be saying something when he is

*Review, p. 368.  † The Elohim Revealed, p. 472.
saying nothing;' &c.* If the reader should hesitate to accept, in its whole sweeping extent, the assertion, that we have urged "all the arguments against immediate imputation which were ever advanced by Placeus, or by Pelagians, Socinians or Remonstrants," we can assure him that it is just as true as that we have assailed the doctrine at all. The reason of our argument to prove that our doctrine was not that of Placeus was, that the periodicals of the New School, seizing upon a hint in the Southern Presbyterian Review, were ringing the changes upon the assertion that our doctrine, as set forth in Breckinridge's Theology, was Placeanism. And the argument of the "whole section," to which the reviewer alludes, consists entirely in the quotation of certain passages from Breckinridge, with parallel citations from De Moor's Commentary upon Marck, and from Hoornbeek, who "plant themselves upon our very position as the ground of defence against the objections of those who denied immediate imputation."† What that position is, we cannot state more briefly and clearly than in the language of Samuel Rutherford, a member of the Westminster Assembly. "We sinned intrinsically in Adam, as parts, as members, as being in his loins; and we are thence, 'by nature, children of wrath.'"—Eph. ii: 3.‡ Hence his sin is imputed to us, not contrary to, but in precise accordance with the fact. "We sinned in him, and fell with him in his first transgression." It is imputed to us in the very sense in which it is, in fact, ours—by virtue of Adam's causative relation to us, and the law of representative union, already considered. Thus, ours in its penal demerit, it is equally ours in its criminal enormity, which is the ground upon which the penalty is justly denounced and enforced.

Thus far we have merely sought to rectify the false impressions which the representations of our reviewer are calculated to make. It is due, however, both to ourselves and to the cause of truth, to call attention distinctly to the precise theological position from which the professor assails us—to the peculiarities of his own system, zeal for which has given the review its hostile character. It may be, as the reviewer states, that the author "makes distinctions where there is no difference, and supposes himself to be saying something when he is saying nothing." In what follows, we shall point out what appear to us distinctions

†The Elohim Revealed, p. 505.
‡Rutherford, in The Elohim Revealed, p. 468.
which are vital to the gospel scheme, and which are disregarded or obliterated by the reviewer.

That Adam was a type of Christ, Paul assures us; and that the parallel does not hold in all respects, he further testifies, (Rom. v: 14, 15,) and is also a necessary inference, from the fact that Adam was a creature,—the second Adam, the coequal Son of God; and that, under the covenant in which the former stood, the dispensation is of debt under law; whilst the covenant of which Christ is surety is, in its relation to man, characteristically of free gift by grace. The eternal covenant was prior to, and determinate of, the assumption of humanity and actual headship to the elect by the Son of God. The covenant of works was subsequent to, and predicated upon the creation of Adam's person, invested with the office of parental head of the race. The provisions made with the first Adam had respect to a seed which were already in him intrinsically, as the natural and involuntary fountain and cause of their being. Those embraced in the covenant of grace had respect to a seed who were not yet in Christ, and whose ultimate inbeing is consequent upon the supernatural power of Christ's will, exercised in their regeneration. The condemnation which passes on all, under the violated covenant of works, passes, therefore, on none who were not by nature in Adam in the transgression; whilst the justification which is bestowed under the covenant of grace is to those, none of whom are in Christ otherwise than contrary to nature, by transforming grace. The one awards sentence, according to the desert of the creature. The other bestows salvation, according to the goodness of God. The fundamental distinction between law and grace, which is thus traceable in the whole doctrine of God, is, in some of its most important points, obliterated in the criticisms and excluded from the system of our reviewer. Of this the evidence is abundant. In The Elohim Revealed, the ground is taken that, since our relation to Adam and to the sentence of condemnation for his sin, is under the covenant of works, the criterion of which is the law, it follows, that we cannot be held responsible for the first transgression, except on the ground that we are truly criminal in that sin,—that God regards and treats us as sinners, because we are sinners. Upon this our reviewer remarks:—"Then, by parity of reason, he cannot regard the personally unrighteous as righteous; he cannot justify the ungodly. Then, what is to become of us sinners? The objections against the imputation of sin bear with all their force against the imputation of righteousness. . . . A
fourth objection to his doctrine is, it destroys the analogy between Adam and Christ, or it necessitates the adoption of the doctrine of subjective justification. We must either deny that the sin of Adam (as *alienum peccatum*) stands in a relation to our condemnation analogous to that in which the righteousness of Christ, as distinguished from our own, stands to our justification; or we must admit the analogy to be, that as we derive a corrupt nature from Adam, and are on that account condemned, so we derive a holy nature from Christ, and are on the ground of that nature justified.”* We do not here pause to dwell on the error of the assumption that the imputation of Christ’s righteousness is made contrary to fact. We are not “regarded and treated as righteous,” in ourselves; but—in precise accordance with the fact—as persons who, in themselves sinners, are grafted into and one with their righteous Head. But is it so, that our condemnation in Adam is as gratuitous as is our justification in Christ? Is it so, that the cross of Christ sheds no new light upon the government of God;—that the covenant of grace adds no new principles to those which were embodied in the institutes of Eden? Are we no more deserving of the death which Adam incurred, than of the gift of life which Christ bestows? This doctrine is reasserted again and again by the reviewer. “The main point,” says he, “in the analogy between Christ and Adam, as presented in the theology of the Protestant Church, and as exhibited by the apostle is, that as in the case of Christ his righteousness, as something neither done by us nor wrought in us, is the judicial ground of our justification, with which inward holiness is connected as an invariable consequence; so in the case of Adam, his offence as something out of ourselves, a *peccatum alienum*, is the judicial ground of the condemnation of our race; of which condemnation, spiritual death, or inward corruption is the expression and the consequence. It is this principle which is fundamental to the Protestant theology, and to the evangelical system, in the form in which it is presented in the Bible, which is strenuously denied by Dr. Baird.”† Again: “Our author teaches that none but sinners can be punished; and by sinners he means those chargeable with moral criminality and pollution.” In proof, the reviewer cites several passages, closing with the following: “The doctrine involved in the justice of God, and proclaimed in his word, is, that every intelligent creature shall be dealt with in precise accordance with his works, [and yet the author expects to be saved!] under the provi-

* Review, p. 344.  
† Ibid, p. 341.
sions of the law and the covenant therein incorporated. That law provides that the sinner, [he who is chargeable with crime and moral turpitude,] and the sinner only, shall be punished. and that in precise proportion to the enormity of his sins.† The language thus quoted from the book (p. 489) constitutes part of the discussion of the doctrine of original sin imputed, which, of necessity, comes under the provisions of the legal covenant, and is so treated. Into an extract from this discussion does our reviewer interpolate the exclamation, "and yet the author expects to be saved!" Yes! he does cherish that blessed hope. But not by the works of the law, nor at its bar. "Ye are become dead to the law by the body of Christ, that ye should be married to another." Christ’s people will never appear before the tribunal of the law.

The Reviewer’s Theory of Original Sin. The sentiments of our reviewer, which we have just illustrated, are followed out by him to their legitimate results in relation to original sin. "We sinned in Adam in the same sense that we died in Christ."‡ His sin was to us alienum peccatum—a foreign crime. "This doctrine does not include the idea of a mysterious identity of Adam and his race; nor that of a transfer of the moral turpitude of his sin to his descendants. It does not teach that his offence was personally or properly the sin of all men, or that his act was, in any mysterious sense, the act of his posterity. Neither does it imply, in reference to the righteousness of Christ, that his righteousness becomes personally and inherently ours, or that his moral excellence is in any way transferred from him to believers. The sin of Adam, therefore, is no ground to us of remorse; and the righteousness of Christ is no ground of self-complacency in those to whom it is imputed. This doctrine merely teaches, that in virtue of the union, representative and natural, between Adam and his posterity, his sin is the ground of their condemnation,—that is, of their subjection to penal evils."‡‡ The reviewer charges us with joining with Placeus, Remonstrants, Pelagians and Socinians, in assailing the doctrine of immediate imputation. We pray the reader to compare the above with the following statement of Turrettin. "At first the Remonstrants spake ambiguously, so that it was uncertain what position they assumed. But afterward, in their Apology, chapter vii., they plainly show themselves to favor the Socinians; retaining, indeed, the name of imputation, but taking away the thing itself, whilst they declare the sin of Adam to be imputed

by God to his posterity; not as though he held them to be really guilty of the same sin and crime with Adam, but as he willed them to be born subject to the same evil to which Adam rendered himself obnoxious by sin.‘* The designation of Adam’s sin, as, to us, _peccatum alienum_, originated with Pelagius; in reply to whom, Augustine says, that “it was, indeed, another’s, when those who when born, were to bear it, did not yet exist; but now, by carnal generation, it belongs to those to whom it has not yet been forgiven through the spiritual regeneration.’† The Pelagian phraseology was adopted by the Remonstrants (see their Apology, &c.) and repudiated by the Reformed writers. According to the Westminster divines, the sin is not _peccatum alienum_, but _commune_. ‘We sinned in him.’

The corruption of our nature was the consequence of Adam’s sin. But how? “Our depraved nature,” says our reviewer, “is the penal consequence of Adam’s sin, not of ours; just as our holiness is the gracious gift for Christ’s righteousness, and not something self-originated and self-deserved.”‡ Here the parallel is not well sustained. Upon the principles of the Review, if depravity is the punishment which we incur by being regarded and treated as sinners, then the sanctification of believers is the reward to which they become entitled by being regarded and treated as righteous; the regarding and treating may be gracious, but the sanctification is of debt. Not only is depravity represented as a penal consequence of Adam’s sin, but it is so represented to the exclusion of the idea that it is a consequence naturally flowing out of the sin.

“The corruption of nature derived from Adam is not, as Dr. Baird, with strange confusion of thought persists in regarding it, a physiological fact, but a fact in the moral government of God. Our author treats it as a question of physics, belonging to the general category of propagation, to be accounted for on the ground of what he calls ‘the mysteries of generation;’ ignoring the distinction between physical laws§ and the principles of God’s dealings with rational creatures.’‖ If the reader is startled at the seeming indelicacy of the phrase “mysteries of generation,” here attributed to us, we are happy to assure him that he will not find it in the book. It is of the coinage of our reviewer. But the important

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‡ Review p. 359.
§ The reviewer writes as though physics and physiology were convertible terms!
matter is, that the idea of native depravity being a fact in the moral government of God, is here represented as contradictory to the supposition that it is a physiological fact. How far this position is consistent with the doctrine of Job's friends, who thought it impossible to bring a clean thing out of an unclean—with the lamentation of David in the fifty-first Psalm—or with the testimony of Christ to Nicodemus, (John iii: 6, 7,) we will not pause to inquire. We had supposed that the laws of nature were from that same God who wields the sceptre of moral government; and that they are mutually adapted to each other, as parts of one great whole. Further; we know of but two classes of causes of phenomena, to wit: natural laws, otherwise designated second causes, and the immediate power of God. The moral government, therefore, as contradistinguished from physiological laws, can be referred to no cause other than the immediate power of God. Thus is he made to be the author of our depravity. The process traced by the reviewer is circuitous; but the result to which he comes is this, as a few citations will show. Says he: "On the ground of the personal sin of Adam, as the representative of the race, God withdrew from men his favor and spirit; they thereby lost his image and became inwardly depraved."* "It is enough for all the purposes of his [Paul's] argument, that that sin [Adam's] was the ground of the loss of the divine favor, the withholding of divine influence, and the consequent corruption of our nature."† "These [Reformed] confessions teach that original righteousness, as a punishment of Adam's sin, was lost, and by that defect‡ the tendency to sin, or corrupt disposition, or corruption of nature, is occasioned. Though they speak of original sin as being first negative, i. e., the loss of righteousness, and secondly, positive, or corruption of nature, yet by the latter they state is to be understood, not the infusion of any thing in itself sinful, but an actual tendency or disposition to evil, resulting from the loss of righteousness. ... [Goodwin,] in common with the Reformers, represents original sin as having a positive as well as a negative side. This, however, results from the active nature of the soul. If there is no tendency to the love and service of God, there is from this very defect a tendency to self and sin."§

Here it will be seen that the withdrawal of the divine favor and withholding of divine influence is viewed as the cause of the loss

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† Hodge on the Romans, p. 135.
‡ The italics are the Commentator's own.
§ Hodge on the Romans, p. 136.
of original righteousness. "God withdrew from men his favor and Spirit; they thereby lost his image." Further: original righteousness is supposed to be of such a nature that its loss is not, of itself, a depravation of the soul. It is but one of two causes of depravity, of which the other is the activity of the moral nature. Prior to the action of this cause there may be no original righteousness; but there is as little of corruption or moral turpitude. The soul has no part in Adam's turpitude, and has yet generated none in itself. Not until the activity of the moral nature comes into operation is depravity developed. Further: this cause is supposed to lie in abeyance for a time, however brief. In order to establish the doctrine that our relation to Adam's sin is merely penal and not criminal, we are assured no less than three times in succession, in the commentary on the Romans, that the death of infants is not demanded by the law of nature written in the heart. "The law or covenant which brings death on all men," [according to Paul's argument, in Rom. v: 12, &c.] "is not the law of Moses, because multitudes died before that was given, (v. 14.) Nor is it the law of nature written upon the heart, since multitudes die who have never violated even that law, (v. 14.)" Again: "Neither is the violation of the law of nature sufficient to explain the fact that all men are subject to death, because even those die who have never broken that law." "This universality in the infliction of penal evil cannot be accounted for on the ground of the violation of the law of Moses, since men were subject to such evil before that law was given; nor yet on account of the violation of the more general law written on the heart, since even they are subject to this evil who have never personally sinned at all. We must conclude, therefore, that men are regarded and treated as sinners on account of the sin of Adam."*

Thus it appears upon the showing of our reviewer, that the infants of whom he speaks, when called to the bar of God, are not liable to any criminal charge whatever. The law of Sinai does not condemn them. The law in their own hearts urges no accusation. The only charge against them is, of sustaining such a relation to Adam as to be involved in his punishment, without sharing in the turpitude of his sin.

A single additional citation will complete the view in this direction:—"As the term death is used for any and every evil judicially inflicted as the punishment of sin, the amount and nature of the evil

*Hodge on the Romans, pp. 114, 119, 133.
not being expressed by the word; it is no part of the apostle’s doctrine that eternal misery is inflicted on any man for the sin of Adam, irrespective of inherent depravity or actual transgression."** Here, be it observed, the question is not as to the extent to which the grace of Christ has provided salvation for infant or adult; but, What was that death which, by law, passed upon all, for Adam’s sin—that death which reigned from Adam to Moses, even over infants? Dr. Hodge, being interpreter, it is not eternal misery. What then is the situation of those infants whom we have just traced to the bar of God, in a state of freedom from all impeachment, except for Adam’s sin? At the tribunal to which they are called, there is no penal sentence short of eternal misery. That is not denounced against them; and, in short, thus innocent of all real crime, and having left behind them the infusions imposed because of Adam’s sin, they are under no curse,—they need no Saviour!

In respect to our apostasy in the person of Adam, the reviewer says: "Apostasy being an act of self-determination, it can be predicated only of persons, and if the apostasy of Adam can be predicated of us, then we existed as persons, thousands of years before we existed at all. If any man says he believes this, then, as we think he deceives himself, and does not understand what he says. Dr. Baird, however, asserts that he did thus act in Adam, and that he feels sorry for it. He teaches that we are bound to feel remorse and self-reproach for this act of self-determination, performed so many centuries before self existed. This is represented as a genuine form of religious experience, an experience due to the teachings and influence of God’s Holy Spirit. This a very serious matter. To attribute to the Spirit of God the mistakes and figments of our own minds—to represent as a genuine form and manifestation of the divine life, what is a mere delusion of our own imagination, or offspring of our pride of intellect, is a very grave offence, and a very great evil."† On this place we make two or three remarks.

1. We have distinctly defined apostasy to be "the self depravation of a nature created holy," and stated as distinctly that the only case in which the crime could have been personally predicated of any of Adam’s seed would be upon the supposition that he had not fallen, and they had been put on trial personally.‡ Further, we have stated that "it would be a false and impossible remorse, which should assume the apostasy of Adam to be a private, several and

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* Hodge on the Romans, p. 135.
† Review, p. 357.
‡ The Elohim Revealed, p. 509.
personal sin of the several posterity of Adam, instead of being common and native."* In a passage already quoted (above p. 13) we have carefully guarded against the supposition that our oneness with Adam implies an obliterating of our distinctive personality, or the idea that we personally sinned in the apostasy. These distinctions are recognized throughout the book. They are probably among those which, in the reviewer's estimation, are without a difference. He altogether disregards them, and every where represents us as teaching that we, personally, sinned in Adam.

2. If the reviewer's argument be worth anything, we are not chargeable with apostasy at all. This, however, we have seen is essential to his system. We are only punished for an apostasy in which we have no criminal part.

3. By turning to The Elohim Revealed, page 499, the reader will see that it is not Dr. Baird, but Dr. Goodwin, whose confession of guilt and profession of contrition for the apostasy excites the alternate sarcasm and indignation of the reviewer. And we venture to advise the reader to be sure that he is at least as profoundly versed in the deep things of God, as was that distinguished member of the Westminster Assembly, before he admits, too readily, the criticisms of the reviewer, on this point.

The Reviewer's Doctrine of Depravity.

In respect to the essential depravity of man's nature, as contradistinguished from active corruption and actual sin, we state that, "the law demands holiness—a word which does not express any form of mere action, but a state of all the powers and of the nature itself, conformed to God's nature. To this law Christ was conformed from his first conception, and in being so, illustrated the extent of the requirements of the law, which says, Be holy. He was in the womb, 'that holy thing.' To the law, thus comprehensive in its demands; thus claiming the allegiance of the soul and nature, as well as the actions and life, want of conformity is sin."† And again, "The soul is that which in its substance and powers intrinsically, as much as in their exercises, was created and ordained to be the image and glory of God. Conformity of this substance to this, its exalted office, is holiness, the reverse is sin."‡ Here, the reviewer cannot find terms strong enough to express his scorn. Not content with the assertion that he can discover no meaning in our language, he declares that he does not believe the author had a meaning at all. The reader who appreciates the

reviewer's theory above indicated, will readily understand the significance of this failure of comprehension.

And now let the reader glance over the theory here traced out in its most conspicuous features, and ask himself, by what accommodation of language it can be called a doctrine of original sin. Rather is it a theory of original punishment. Not only is it asserted that Adam's transgression is not our sin,—not only is it denied that the depravity of man is a physiological fact, a phenomenon of generation, but it is denied that in the earlier period of infant existence any criminal charge is predicable at all, either under the law written on the heart or that of Moses. The idea that the law applies to the soul intrinsically as well as to its exercises,—that sin may be predicated of its attitude as well as of its actings,—is represented to be as absurd as to talk of "the moral character of a tree, or the correct deportment of a house." At best, the system resembles the "exercise scheme" of Hopkins. Native depravity is not "anything in itself sinful." The earliest moral responsibility, is based upon "the actual tendency or disposition to evil," which is generated by the withdrawal of divine influence and the activity of the soul—a tendency which, at least, so far as it is sinful—is the product of personal activity, since it is not predicable of infants, such as those of whom Paul speaks.

In respect to this whole scheme, the reader is requested to compare the teachings of the professor with those of Whitby, in his commentary on Romans, v. 19. He will find that they stand thus related:—(1.) Whilst the former states that "the word translated have sinned, may be rendered, have become guilty, or regarded and treated as sinners."* Whitby interprets the language as meaning that "we became obnoxious to that death which was the punishment of his sin,"—a phrase precisely answering to our reviewer's definition of his own word, guilty. (2.) In support of this interpretation of the word, sin, Whitby cites a number of passages from the Old Testament. Our reviewer's evidence is selected from the same passages; with the exception that he takes Job ix. 29, instead of Whitby's appeal to Job ix. 20. (3.) Whitby defines the penalty incurred as being "death and temporal calamities;" whilst Dr. Hodge says it does not inflict eternal misery. (4.) Whitby, holding that imputation implies a veritable charge, denies that Adam's sin is imputed to us. The reviewer asserts that Adam's sin is imputed to us, but denies this to imply that it is really ours. (5.) They both

* Hodge on the Romans, 8vo, 1835, p. 184.
with one voice cry out against the absurdity of the idea that we sinned thousands of years before we existed. How widely they differ; the reader may determine.

It may be supposed that the statements of doctrine, which we have quoted from the reviewer, are causal and inadvertant. On the contrary, they result logically, and necessarily from his first principles to which we have alluded. If the parallel between Adam and Christ involves a gratuitous condemnation of Adam's seed, it becomes requisite, in order to apply this theory to the language of Paul, to eliminate the case to which the apostle refers, of everything which would constitute a ground of deserved condemnation. Paul's argument is that infants die, therefore they sinned in Adam. Now, if there be in them a corruption which deserves death, it must be recognized as inseparable from, and the effect and _terminus ad quem_ of a crime of which we are really guilty in Adam; else, the apostle must have traced the death of all, not to that sin of Adam which is denied to be their crime, but to the depravity thus recognized as native in their hearts.

At length, as the infant faculties expand, depravity is developed from the two causes already indicated—the withholding of divine influence, and the activity of the soul. Of neither of these causes can it be pretended that the individual is the criminal author. They are both immediately from God. But they operate so as to induce "the tendency to sin, or corrupt disposition or corruption of nature." Here, the objection presents itself: How can tendencies thus induced be charged upon us as our crimes? "This corruption of nature or want of original righteousness," says Goodwin, "in such case would not have been nor could not have been accounted a sin; a punishment it might."* We have the answer of our reviewer.—"The _πρωτόν_ ἔσεσθαι of such speculations is, that moral principles or dispositions owe their character to their origin, and not to their nature. It is assumed that innate hereditary depravity cannot have the nature of sin in us unless it be self-originated. . . Adam was created righteous. Original righteousness in him had a moral character in the sight of God, although not self-originated. It is a first principle of Pelagianism, that moral character can attach only to acts of self-determination and their consequences. All Pelagians, therefore, deny that Adam was created holy. He could not be holy, they say, unless he originated his own character.

* Goodwin's Works, folio, vol. iii. p. 15, in The Elohim Revealed, p. 44.
So, all these false theories assume that inherent corruption cannot have the nature of sin unless self-originated. If we are born corrupt, that corruption must have sprung from our own act either in a former state of existence or in the person of Adam. When God, by the almighty power of his Spirit, quickens the spiritually dead, the holiness thus originated is none the less holiness.”* Here we have another illustration of the habitual confusion of law and grace.—Because God may work in us holiness, therefore he may produce depravity! In fact, the whole argument results from the reviewer’s contempt for some of those distinctions which seem to us important. It is true Adam was created holy. But the question is not whether holiness is good and sin evil, in itself: but, To whom does the merit or demerit attach? Was Adam entitled to the merit of his concreated holiness? Or, could he have acquired any merit at all, had he been so constituted that he could not sin? That freedom which was given him alike to holiness and sin constituted an element in his moral agency without which neither merit nor demerit were possible to him. The saints in heaven are holy. But to whom attaches the merit of that holiness? To them, or to that blessed One who works in them both to will and to do of his good pleasure? The very cases cited by the reviewer prove, therefore, that the merit attaches not to the subject of the attributes, whether holy or unholy, but to the intelligent author of them. If we are not criminally responsible for the origination of our depravity, neither are we for its existence and action. It may be our calamity, it cannot be our crime.

* Review, p. 358.
stituted the head and representative of his people; and, in virtue of this federal union, and agreeably to the terms of the eternal covenant, they are regarded and treated as having done what he did and suffered what he suffered in their name and in their behalf."*

According to our understanding of the Scriptures, it was provided in the eternal covenant that the elect should be actually ingrafted into Christ by his Spirit, and their acceptance and justification is by virtue of this their actual union to him. "This principle is not to be so understood as though the character thus conveyed were the meritorious cause of the relations predicated; as if the believer were justified by the personal righteousness which he receives through the power of Christ's Spirit given to him. On the contrary, the union, which is constituted by virtue of the transmission of the nature, itself conveys a proprietary title in the moral and legal relations of the head; whilst the efficient principle which thus unites, is also fruitful in effects appropriate to the nature whence it flows. Thus, the sin of Adam, and the righteousness of Christ are severally imputed to their seed, by virtue of the union, constituted in the one case by the principle of natural generation, and in the other, by 'the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus,' the Holy Spirit, the principle of regeneration. At the same time, the power by which the union is in these cases severally wrought produces likeness to the head."†

This view is not only stated in specific terms, again and again, but is wrought into the whole texture of the book, to wit:—that "the matter of justification is that very, whole and entire righteousness which the Lord Jesus wrought by his obedience and suffering;" and that "the ground of the justification of the elect, the cause of the imputation to them of the righteousness of Christ, is their actual inbeing in Christ. They are 'accepted in the Beloved,'—Eph. i. 6, because they really are in Him."‡ This doctrine, our reviewer persists in representing as undistinguishable from the Romish heresy of justification by virtue of infused righteousness, the subjective holiness of the believer; and it is in opposition to it that he postulates the statement above cited, of a "constituted" headship and "federal union." Whatever, therefore, is comprehended in the meaning of these terms, they do not embrace but exclude the mystical union in its relation to justification.

How important this point is to the questions involved between us

is evident. If the imputation of Christ's righteousness be founded in a real inbeing in him, wrought by the uniting power of his Spirit in regeneration,—if it is thus that we are brought within the provisions of the covenant of grace to our justification, it follows, (we will venture the word,) incontestably, that the imputation to us of Adam's sin, is founded in a real inbeing in him, by natural generation, by virtue of which we come under the provisions of the covenant of works, to our condemnation. But this, according to our reviewer, is "simply a physiological theory," involving "a mysterious identity," which he cannot admit. Hence the necessity of ignoring the doctrine, in its relation to justification.

And yet this writer does not, as far as we are aware, in terms deny the doctrine in question, nor does he affirm it. He merely in silence, excludes it. Such, however, is not the case with all the disciples of his system. My examiners in Presbytery vehemently protested that the mystical union had nothing to do with justification, but only with sanctification. And a writer who in the True Witness has devoted a series of numbers to misrepresentation of me, is equally explicit. He declares his allegiance in the first number:

"I found him [Dr. Baird] attempting to tear up by the roots the clearest and most beautiful exposition of the 5th of Romans God ever permitted any man to make. I had been really so simple, way out here in the pine woods, as to think that no man in the church could for a moment suppose any other exegesis of this great and important chapter could be given, [than that of Dr. Hodge.] We had seen, with triumphant exultation, how, with this interpretation of Paulism, he had leveled to the dust the whole host of new school men; how Stuart, and Barnes, and Tholuck, and Park, and all others appeared as mere babblers in comparison with the great light that shines in such glory on Princeton heights."* In defence of the exegesis thus so enthusiastically embraced, he represents it as perfectly certain, from the tenor of Paul's argument, "that God does account and accept our persons as righteous in him, as our federal head, prior in the order of nature, to our real union with him as our vital head?"† "But Dr. Baird would have this imputation to proceed upon what he terms our inbeing in Christ. That is, after we have been made holy through our vital union to him, then his righteousness becomes ours, and is imputed to us as what is really ours, not forensically so. . . . Now, I challenge the very first passage of sacred writ to

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*True Witness, March 10, 1860.  †Ibid.
prove we have or can have our inbeing in Christ vitally and really, before we have our inbeing in him legally or by imputation. It is impossible: the one is the cause of the other. . . . So we conclude in respect of Adam, or the apostle reasons illogically; that, as we cannot be justified in the sight of God, except by our federal union with Christ, nor have our real inbeing in him before we have it legally; so we cannot be condemned in God’s sight, except by our federal union with Adam, nor have our real inbeing in him, before we have it legally. Hence the conclusion to my mind seems inevitable, that, so far from the federal union being dependent upon, and in consequence of the natural, the natural would never have been but for the federal union.”*

Such is the doctrine in vindication of which this writer is permitted by the editor of the True Witness to write “heretic” against my name.

Thus, then, stands the case.—The doctrine that we are clothed with Christ’s righteousness by being ingrafted into his mystical person, is ignored and excluded in the reviewer’s own exposition and argument;—as stated clearly in The Elohim Revealed, it is by him persistently confounded with the Romish doctrine of infused righteousness; logical consistency demands its rejection from his system; and by his disciples it is in terms repudiated and derided. He may refuse to be held responsible for their representations. They, however, none the less truly exhibit the logical result and actual effect of his teachings. How important the consequences involved it is for good men to consider.

*Testimony of Orthodox Authorities.*

That the doctrine which is thus assailed and repudiated is that of the Reformed Church we had supposed to be unquestionable. Hence, in writing our work, attention was given mainly to the subject of original sin; the correlative doctrine of justification being merely sketched in a parallel to the other, without entering into the argument or citing the standard theologians. The present seems an appropriate occasion for a partial supply of the latter omission.

Says Calvin: “That the cavils of Osiander may not deceive the inexperienced, I confess that we are destitute of this incomparable blessing [justification] till Christ becomes ours. I attribute, therefore, the highest importance to the connection between the head and members; to the inhabitation of Christ in our hearts; in a word, to the mystical union by

* True Witness, March 31.
which we enjoy him; so that, being made ours, he makes no partakers of the blessings with which he is furnished. We do not, then, contemplate him at a distance out of ourselves, that his righteousness may be imputed to us; but because we have put him on, and are ingrafted into his body; and because he has deigned to unite us to himself, therefore we glory in a participation of his righteousness.”

Says Owen: “The foundation of the imputation asserted is union. Hereof there are many grounds and causes as hath been declared. But that which we have immediate respect unto as the foundation of this imputation, is that whereby the Lord Christ and believers do actually coalesce into one mystical person. This is by the Holy Spirit inhabiting in him as the head of the church in all fulness, and in all believers according to their measure, whereby they become members of his mystical body. . . . Upon supposition of this union, reason will grant the imputation pleaded for to be reasonable; at least, that there is such peculiar ground for it as is not to be exemplified in any things natural or political among men. . . . That which is imputed is the righteousness of Christ.”

Boston, in his Fourfold State, opens The State of Grace, Head 2, with a full discussion of the mystical union in a parallel with the natural union to Adam, and upon that union predicates all the blessings of salvation:—justification, peace, adoption, sanctification, &c. “The first particular benefit that a sinner has by his union with Christ is justification; for, being united to Christ, he has communion with him in his righteousness.” “Thus the person united to Christ is justified. You may conceive the whole proceeding in this manner. The avenger of blood pursuing the criminal, Christ as the Saviour of lost sinners does by the Spirit apprehend him, and draw him to himself; and he, by faith, lays hold on Christ; so the Lord our righteousness and the unrighteous creature unite. From this union with Christ results a communion with him in his unsearchable riches, and consequently in his righteousness, that white raiment which he has for clothing of the naked. Rev. iii: 18. Thus the righteousness of Christ becomes his: and because it is his by unquestionable title, it is imputed to him; it is reckoned his in the judgment of God, which is always according to truth.”

But why should we accumulate evidence on this point, on which the reader will find the ready testimony of the first standard writer to whom he turns? We will only add the Confessions of the Scotch Church and of our own.

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*Calvin Inst., L. III., cap. xi. § 10.  
†Owen on Justification, ch. 9.  
"It behooveth us," says the first Scotch confession, "to apprehend Christ Jesus, with his justice and satisfaction, who is the end and accomplishment of the law, by whom we are set at liberty, that the curse and malediction of God fall not upon us, albeit we fulfill not the same in all points; for God, the Father, beholding us in the body of his Son Christ Jesus, accepteth our imperfect obedience as it were perfect, and covers our works which are defiled with many spots, with the justice of his Son."*

"We assuredly believe that by baptism we are ingrafted in Christ Jesus, to be made partakers of his justice, whereby our sins are covered and remitted."†

Our next authority is the "Form of Examination before the Communion, approved by the General Assembly of the Kirk of Scotland, 1591, and appointed to be used in families and schools." It is commonly called Craig's Catechism.

"III. Of our participation of Christ and his merits. Ques. How is that wrought? Ans. Through his continual intercession for us in heaven.—Heb. vii: 25. Q. Declare how that is done. A. Hereby the Holy Spirit is sent.—John xiv: 16, 26. Q. What doth the Spirit in this work? A. He offereth Christ and his graces, and moveth us to receive him. Q. How doth he offer Christ to us? A. By the preaching of the evangel.—Rom. x: 13; xiii: 15. Q. How doth he move us to receive him? A. Through printing in our hearts true faith in Christ.—Acts xvi: 14. Q. What thing is faith in Christ? A. A sure persuasion that he is the only Saviour of the world, but ours in special, who believe in him.—John vi. Q. What doth this faith work? A. Our inseparable union with Christ in his graces.—Eph. iii: 16–19. Q. What is the first fruit of this union? A. Remission of our sins and imputation of justice.—Rom. vi: 19."

We need not recite the various testimonies contained in the Westminster standards. The Shorter Catechism embraces the whole in a few words. "We are made partakers of the redemption purchased by Christ by the effectual application of it to us by his Holy Spirit. The Spirit applieth to us the redemption purchased by Christ, by working faith in us, and thereby uniting us to Christ, in our effectual calling. They that are effectually called do in this life partake of justification, adoption, sanctification, and the several benefits which in this life do either accompany or flow from them." Baptism "doth signify and seal our ingrafting into Christ, and par-

taking of the benefits of the covenant of grace, and our engagement to be the Lord's."

In Fisher's catechism this doctrine is fully unfolded. A single sentence is a clue to his entire system. "What is the connection between effectual calling and justification? A. In effectual calling, sinners being united to Christ by faith have thereby communion with him in his righteousness for justification."

Personal Attitude of the Reviewer.

We may not close without a word in respect to the attitude which, throughout, the reviewer assumes, and the style in which he has thought proper to express himself, as towards the author. That, in these respects, the article is indefensible, the last paragraph is evidence, at the same time that it is one of the most exceptionable passages in the entire review. Whilst it reveals a consciousness of the improprieties already committed, it attempts to weaken the force of public condemnation, by an additional wrong—by appeal to the lex talionis—accusing me of doing violence to the rules of courtesy, in the book. In respect to that charge, the evidence was some time since laid before the public; upon which a decisive verdict has been rendered. Impelled to the publication of my treatise by a sense of imperative obligation—it was written under an impressive apprehension of the responsibility involved; and with the most anxious endeavor to meet that responsibility in a spirit of Christian charity and fraternal courtesy—speaking what seemed to me the truth, irrespective of persons; but speaking the truth in love. Toward Dr. Hodge especially a heartfelt respect dictated a style which has been criticised as too deferential to accord with good taste. I was willing to err in that direction; and after the work was issued from the press, went out of the way to give further expressions to feelings of sincere personal regard.*

* The following note accompanied a tinted copy of the book:

Woodbury, N. J., Nov. 23, 1859.

Rev. and Dear Sir:—The failure of my publishers has temporarily suspended the issue of the accompanying work. A few copies having been printed on extra paper, I have obtained some of them in advance, and venture to ask your acceptance of this copy, as an assurance that if I have ventured in it to dissent from some of your published opinions, it is in entire consistency with the most cordial personal respect and esteem, with which I am

Yours truly,

Samuel J. Baird.

Rev. Charles Hodge, D.D.

To this note no response has been received, except the notices of the book which have appeared in the pages of the Repertory.
All this may have been misunderstood. The single object was, to
give such an impress to any discussions which might ensue, as to
prevent cause of exultation to the enemy, or occasion of grief to
the friends of peace.

In what manner these overtures have been met, the public is aware;
in a style to which I can make no response. The design, however,
is manifest—by assuming the attitude of unapproachable superiority,
and adopting language of most contemptuous disparagement,
and a tone of uncompromising proscription, to startle discussion
into silence, stigmatize the doctrines which the reviewer opposes, and
enforce unquestioning acquiescence in his peculiar opinions. Perhaps
it is better so. It has rendered necessary a more distinct exposi-
tion, than might in other circumstances have been proper, of the
true character of those opinions; contrary as I believe them to be
to the standards of our church, and of very serious import to the
system of grace.* Nor am I aware of anything which entitles the
reviewer to peculiar exemption from such criticism, or to recognition
as the gnomon of Old School orthodoxy. On the contrary, the his-
tory of the great questions which have been agitated in the church
within the last thirty years, from the issues raised by the Act and
Testimony to those of Romish baptism and the idea and constitution
of the church,—affords abundant illustration of the fact that
dissent from the reviewer's most cherished opinions may be per-
fectly consistent with unimpeachable fealty to the church, and even
essential to harmony with her sentiments on the most important
subjects. And a doctrine of imputation which comes to us boasting
the suffrages of Messrs. Stuart and Barnes,† and which is derived
from the fifth of Romans, by an exegesis of the word "sin," which
is essentially that of Whitby, in its argument, its proof texts and
its conclusion, is so far from being entitled to unquestioned cur-

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*The reviewer seems to concede that his system does not precisely con-
form to the primitive standard of Reformed orthodoxy. "We find in the
history of Protestant theology much more inconsistency and confusion during
the sixteenth than during the seventeenth century. It was not until after one
principle had been allowed to modify another that the scheme of doctrine came
to adjust itself to the consistent and moderate form in which it is presented in
the writings of Turretin and Gerhard."—Review, p. 338. The close of the
sixteenth century was signalized by a revival of a philosophical spirit. The
theology of the sixteenth century,—of Calvin,—is characteristically Biblical,
that of the seventeenth, philosophical. The change was no improvement.

† Hodge on the Romans, 8vo., 1835, p. 107.
rency, that it compels the inquiry whether our church was mistaken as to the importance of the doctrinal issues which rent her asunder,—whether there is nothing but words between her and those whom she rejected from her bosom as derelict to the truth.*

Had duty permitted, I would gladly have avoided the present discussion. But the repeated attempt to erect the peculiar opinions of Dr. Hodge into a test of orthodoxy, to denounce and proscribe the doctrine which our church in her catechisms taught me in childhood, and to compel my acceptance of those opinions and rejection of that doctrine, under penalty of the ban of heresy, has left me no alternative but to make an unequivocal statement of the reasons which forbid the exchange, and induce me to regard with distrust and apprehension the scheme which I reject. In making this exposition, I have confined myself to a development, mainly in the reviewer's own language, of the systematic relations and logical consequences of the principles in behalf of which he assails my treatise. Many things of importance in the pages of the review and in the reviewer's system have been left untouched. Enough, I trust, has been said to convince every thoughtful mind that questions of profound importance are involved;—and that it will require for their solution something much more serious than is attempted in the review. The whole subject is commended to the consideration of the church, and to the determination of her glorious Head.

*"There is no mysterious oneness of the race, no transfer of moral character, no assumption of the moral guilt of men for the sin of Adam, involved in the doctrine. Professor Park knows this, for he himself makes the question on this subject to be whether God exercises distributive justice, or sovereignty towards us in causing us to suffer for the sin of Adam." Again,—"Professor Park himself says,—'Our calamities hang suspended on the sovereign purpose of heaven; we say directly, he [Dr. Hodge] says indirectly; we say, without any intervening links; he says, with the intervening links of imputation, guilt, &c.' When we first read this sentence we could hardly believe that Professor Park had been given up to speak the truth thus simply and clearly. It is precisely as he states it. A man is put to death, he says, by a sovereign act; we say, with the trifling intermediate links of guilt and just condemnation."—Reptory, Oct., 1851, pp. 679, 680. If the reader will take into account the reviewer's definition of guilt,—liability to evils which are penal although no real crime is charged,—he will be possessed of the precise extent of the issue on this point between the two professors.